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9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
10	SOUTHERN DISTRI	ICT OF CALIFORNIA
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12	KEVIN ARAGON,	Case No. '23CV0304L KSC
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13	Plaintiff,	Plaintiff's Complaint AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
14	V.	DEMAND FOR JUNE TRIAL
15	v.	1. FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.
16		2. RFDCPA, Cal. Civ. Code. § 1788
	TRI-CITY MEDICAL CENTER;	et seq.
17	CALIFORNIA BUSINESS BUREAU,	3. Cal. Civ. Code § 3345
18	INC.; and SAN DIEGO IMAGING	
19	LLC.	(Unlawful Debt Collection Practices)
	D 6 1	
20	Defendant.	
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22	COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL	
23	COM EMINT MIND DEMINION TORONT TRIBE	
24	Plaintiff Kevin Aragon ("Plaintiff"), by and through his attorneys, alleges	
25	the following against Defendants Tri-City Medical Center ("TCMC"), California	
26	Business Bureau, Inc. ("CBB"), and San Diego Imaging, LLC ("SDI").	
27	Business Bureau, inc. (CDB), and San Diego imaging, LLC (SDI).	
28	INTRODUCTION	
	- 1 -	

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

- 1. Counts I and II of Plaintiff's Complaint is based upon the FDCPA and RFDCPA, which prohibit debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive, and unfair practices connection with the collection of consumer debts.
- 2. Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint is based upon Cal. Civ. Code § 3345, which allows, in an action brought by a disabled person to redress unfair or deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition, recovery up to three times greater than authorized by the statute, or where, the statute does not authorize a specific amount, up to three times greater than the amount the trier of fact would impose in the absence of that affirmative finding.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 3. The District Court has federal question jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
- 4. Supplemental jurisdiction of this court arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the state law claims are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the US Constitution.
- Because Defendants conduct business within the County of San
 Diego, State of California, personal jurisdiction is established.
- 6. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2) in that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this District.

PARTIES

- 7. Plaintiff is a "person" as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(g).
- 8. Plaintiff is a "disabled person" as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(g).
- 9. Plaintiff is a "consumer" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).
- 10. Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Oceanside, California.
- 11. Plaintiff, as a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a consumer debt to Defendant, alleged to have been due and owing, is a "debtor" as that term is defined by California Civil Code § 1788.2(h) of the Rosenthal Act.
- 12. As a partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other similar entity, Defendants are a "person" within the meaning of California Civil Code § 1788.2(g) of the Rosenthal Act.
- 13. Defendants allege Plaintiff owed them money arising out of medical services performed upon Plaintiff by Defendants for treatment of injuries arising out of an industrial work-place accident, without payment being required at the time of services being rendered, and Plaintiff is informed and believes the money alleged to have been owed to Defendants originated from monetary credit that was extended primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and is therefore a "debt" as that term is defined by California Civil Code § 1788.2(d) and is a "debt" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

- 14. Plaintiff allegedly owed a monetary debt to Defendants, which makes Defendants a "creditor(s)" under California Civil Code § 1788.2(i) of the Rosenthal Act.
- 15. Upon information and belief, Defendants were attempting to collect on a debt that originated from monetary credit that was extended primarily for personal, family, or household purposes due to medical services performed upon Plaintiff to treat injuries arising out of a work-place accident without payment being required at the time of services and was therefore a "consumer credit transaction" within the meaning of California Civil Code § 1788.2(e) of the Rosenthal Act.
- 16. Because Plaintiff, a natural person allegedly obligated to pay money to Defendants arising from what Plaintiff is informed and believes was a consumer credit transaction due to medical services performed upon Plaintiff to treat injuries arising out of a work-place accident without payment being required at the time of services, the money allegedly owed was a "consumer debt" within the meaning of California Civil Code § 1788.2(f) of the Rosenthal Act.
- 17. Plaintiff is informed and believes Defendants regularly collect or attempt to collect debts on behalf of themselves, and is therefore both a "debt collector" within the meaning of California Civil Code § 1788.2(c) of the Rosenthal Act, and thereby engages in "debt collection" within the meaning of California Civil Code § 1788.2(b) of the Rosenthal Act.

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- 18. Plaintiff is a "debtor" as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(h).
- 19. At all relevant times herein, Defendant TCMC was a company engaged, by use of mails and telephone in the business of collecting a debt from Plaintiff which qualifies as a "debt," as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(d). Defendant can be served through its principal place of business, located at 4002 Vista Way, Oceanside, CA 92056.
- 20. At all relevant times herein, Defendant CCB was a company engaged, by use of mails and telephone in the business of collecting a debt from Plaintiff which qualifies as a "debt," as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(d) and as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Defendant is a "debt collector" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Defendant can be served at its principal place of business, located at 1711 S Mountain Ave., Monrovia, CA 91017.
- At all relevant times herein, Defendant SDI was a company engaged, 21. by use of mails and telephone in the business of collecting a debt from Plaintiff which qualifies as a "debt," as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(d) and as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Defendant is a "debt collector" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Defendant can be served at through its agent for service of process, Rebecca Fricke, located at 8745 Aero Drive., Suite 200, San Diego, CA 92123.

22. Defendants acted through their agents, employees, officers, members, directors, heirs, successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, representatives, and insurers.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 23. On or about August 1, 2022, Plaintiff was injured in a work-related accident which required emergency medical treatment or services.
- 24. As a result of the work-related accident, Plaintiff was immediately transported to the nearest hospital, Tri-Center Medical Center
- 25. Upon arrival to the hospital, Plaintiff was provided medical treatment/services by Defendant TCMC.
- 26. During Plaintiff's visit on or about August 1, 2022, he informed Defendant TCMC, including the hospital staff, that his injuries were the result of a work-place accident that occurred earlier that same day.
- 27. Plaintiff informed Defendant TCMC and the hospital staff who his employer is, and that he had come directly from work to the emergency room.
- 28. Defendant TCMC is attempting to collect an alleged debt from Plaintiff related to her workplace injury.
- 29. Despite having knowledge that Plaintiff's injuries are the result of a workplace accident, Defendant TCMC began attempting to collect from Plaintiff

directly and sent Plaintiff medical bills/statements for medical treatment he is not legally responsible for.

- 30. Having been advised by Plaintiff at the time of treatment, Defendant TCMC possessed specific information regarding Plaintiff's injury, including the fact that it was a work-related injury; a critical fact which Defendant TCMC knew or should have known.
- 31. Plaintiff's employer accepted liability for the injuries he suffered at work and therefore, any and all amounts due from the medical treatment and/or services rendered in relation to his work-place injury is not Plaintiff's legal responsibility.
- 32. In or around October 2022, Plaintiff received a medical bill from Defendant TCMC for his August 2022 emergency room visit.
- 33. The letter was attempting to collect an amount of \$874.04, of which Plaintiff is not responsible for.
- 34. The letter was attempting to collect an amount that was not permitted by law because Plaintiff was not responsible for any and all medical bills received that were related to his workplace injury.
- 35. In or around December 2022, Plaintiff received a collection letter from Defendant CCB for his August 2022 emergency room visit.

- 36. The bill was attempting to collect an amount of \$885.75 on behalf of Defendant TCMC, of which Plaintiff is not responsible for.
- 37. The letter was attempting to collect an amount that was not permitted by law because Plaintiff was not responsible for any and all medical bills received that were related to her workplace injury.
- 38. In or around December 2022, Plaintiff received a medical bill from Defendant SDI for services rendered during his August 2022 emergency room visit.
- 39. The medical bill was attempting to collect an amount of \$21.48, of which Plaintiff is not responsible for.
- 40. The bill was attempting to collect an amount that was not permitted by law because Plaintiff was not responsible for any and all medical bills received that were related to her workplace injury.
- 41. Upon information and belief, Defendant SDI has access to all the information known to Defendant TCMC about Plaintiff, including medical notes, and/or history of present illnesses (HPI) comments.
- 42. Defendant SDI did not review Plaintiff's medical notes/file and/or HPI comments prior to rendering its medical services/treatment.
- 43. Due to Defendants' abusive actions, Plaintiff suffered from emotional and mental pain and anguish, including but not limited to, stress, anxiety, fear, and confusion.

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- 44. Plaintiff was under the belief that all medical services he received that were related to his workplace injury were not his responsibility and would be paid for by his employer, which is what the law mandates.
- Plaintiff was repeatedly told by his workers compensation attorney 45. that he was not responsible for the medical service related to his workplace injury, but the repeated collection letters caused him to doubt her attorney.
- 46. Defendants had in its possession all information necessary to properly handle the correct billing for the treatment, and despite this, Defendants sent Plaintiff bills and collection letters in an attempt to collect on a debt Plaintiff is not legally responsible for.
- 47. The RFDCPA is a "state version" of the FDCPA that "mimics or incorporates by reference the FDCPA's requirements," including sections 1692d through 1692f, "and makes available the FDCPA's remedies for violations." Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012).
- 48. The RFDCPA is a strict liability statute. Garcia v. Creditors Specialty Serv., No. 14-cv-01806-BLF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159686, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2016).
- 49. Defendants attempted to collect a debt regarding Plaintiff's medical treatment at Tri-City Medical Center emergency room stemming from a workrelated injury covered by workers' compensation.

- 50. The alleged debt Defendants are attempting to collect cannot be lawfully collected from Plaintiff and as a result, the medical bills, statements and/or collection letters contain false, deceptive, and misleading representations.
- 51. Moreover, Plaintiff is a disabled person as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(g).
- 52. Plaintiff's injury substantially limited his ability to engage in manual tasks and he has been unable to use his hand as he normally did prior to the workplace accident.
- 53. Defendants engaged in unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or unfair methods of competition by attempting to collect amounts that cannot lawfully be collected from Plaintiff.
 - 54. Defendants' conduct was directed towards Plaintiff, a disabled person.

COUNT I ALL Defendants (Violations of RFDCPA, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788 et seq.)

- 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.
- 56. Defendants violated the RFDCPA. Defendants' violations include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - a. Defendants violated Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17 by collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt without complying with the

provisions of Sections 1692b to 1692j, inclusive, of . . . Title 15 of the United States Code (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).

- a. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, by engaging in conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection a debt.
- b. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt.
- c. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.
- d. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10), by using false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or obtain information concerning a consumer.
- e. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, by using unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.
- f. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by attempting to collect any amount (including any interest, fee, charge or expense incidental to the principal obligation) that is not permitted by law.

- 57. Defendants' acts, as described above, were done intentionally with the purpose of coercing Plaintiff to pay the alleged debt.
- 58. As a result of the foregoing violations of the RFDCPA, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for actual damages, statutory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.

COUNT II Defendant CCB (Violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.)

- 59. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.
- 60.Defendant CMRE violated the FDCPA. Defendant's violations include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - a. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, by engaging in conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection a debt.
 - b. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt.
 - c. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.

- d. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10), by using false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or obtain information concerning a consumer.
- e. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, by using unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.
- f. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by attempting to collect any amount (including any interest, fee, charge or expense incidental to the principal obligation) that is not permitted by law.
- 61.Defendant's acts, as described above, were done intentionally with the purpose of coercing Plaintiff to pay the alleged debt.
- 62.As a result of the foregoing violations of the FDCPA, CMRE is liable to Plaintiff for actual damages, statutory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.

COUNT III ALL Defendants (Violations of CAL. CIV. CODE § 3345)

- 63. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.
- 64.Cal. Civ. Code § 3345(a) provides that this section will apply in an action brought by disabled persons to redress unfair competition or deceptive acts.

- 65.Cal. Civ. Code § 3345(b) allows a disabled person to recover up to three times greater than authorized by the statute, or, where the statute does not authorize a specific amount, up to three times greater than the amount the trier of fact would impose in the absence of that affirmative finding.
- 66. Plaintiff is a disabled person as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(g).
- 67.Plaintiff's workplace injury left her unable to walk for several months, and unable to work.
- 68.Defendants engaged in unfair competition and/or deceptive acts in its unlawful collection activity, including but not limited to, sending collection letters/statements in an attempt to mislead Plaintiff and collect from her amounts of money she does not in fact owe.
- 69. As a result of Defendants' conduct and violations, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for three times greater than authorized by the FDCPA and RFDCPA.

PRAYER OF RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Kevin Aragon, respectfully requests judgment be entered against Defendants for the following:

- A. Declaratory judgment that Defendant CCB violated the FDCPA;
- B. Statutory damages against Defendant CCB of \$1,000.00 pursuant to the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A);

- C. Actual damages against Defendant CCB pursuant to the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);
- D. Costs and reasonable attorneys' fees against Defendant CCB pursuant to the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3);
- E. Declaratory judgment that Defendants violated the RFDCPA;
- F. Statutory damages against Defendants of \$1,000.00 pursuant to the RFDCPA, Cal. Civ. Code §1788.30(b);
- G. Actual damages against Defendants pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §1788.30(a);
- H. Costs and reasonable attorneys' fees against Defendants pursuant to the RFDCPA, Cal. Civ. Code §1788.30(c);
- I. Treble damages pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 3345;
- J. Punitive damages to be determined at trial, for the sake of example and punishing Defendant for their malicious conduct, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a);
- K. Awarding Plaintiff any pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as may be allowed under the law; and
- L. Any other relief that this Honorable Court deems appropriate.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Please take notice that Plaintiff demands a trial by jury in this action.

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